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7 Nov  
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7 NOV 1962

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Deputy Director/Plans**ATTENTION:** Chief, FE**SUBJECT:** Transmittal of Paper on the Estimated Number of Trucks  
Required to Support Chinese Troops in Tibet

The attached paper on the Estimated Number of Trucks Required to Support Chinese Troops in Tibet, dated 1 November 1962, was prepared in response to your request of 31 October 1962 and confirms the verbal report of members of the Transportation Branch, ORR, made on 1 November 1962. We regard the truck requirement as the maximum necessary to supply logistic support for the forces currently estimated by the Department of the Army to be engaged in the campaign against India and for garrison activities in Tibet. We are continuing our research on this problem and will attempt to have a more definitive estimate as soon as possible.

25X1A

**OTTO E. GURNE**  
Assistant Director  
Research and Reports

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ESTIMATED NUMBER OF TRUCKS  
REQUIRED TO SUPPORT CHINESE TROOPS  
IN TIBET

1 November 1962

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The maximum number of trucks that would be needed to supply Chinese Communist troops currently stationed in the Tibet Military District is estimated to be between 6,000 and 7,000 units. This number represents from 6 to 7 percent of the total Chinese Communist military truck park of about 100,000 units. The total park of civilian and military trucks is believed to be approximately 225,000 units, of which at least 25,000 units are estimated to be inactive for lack of spare parts and the like. Therefore, the number of trucks required to supply troops in the Tibet Military District is estimated to be about 3 to 3.5 percent of the active park of Chinese Communist military and civilian trucks.

The total number of Chinese Communist military forces currently stationed in the Tibet Military District is estimated by the Department of the Army to be approximately 83,000 men. These forces consist of those engaged in combat along the Indian border, and those deployed in garrison behind the fighting fronts. The combat forces are located in the Ladakh, Towang-Longju (or Subansiri), and Li-ma (or Ri-ma) areas and the garrison troops are located in the Ch'ang-tu and Lhasa areas.

The following tabulation summarizes the pertinent data on which the estimate of trucks required is based:

	<u>Troops</u>	<u>Max. Daily Supply Requirement (Tons per Day)</u>	<u>Distance (Miles)</u>	<u>Trucks Required</u>
<u>Areas of Frontier Conflicts</u>				
Ladakh	10,000	98	1,500 a/	1,800
Northeast Frontier	18,000	184		3,000
Towang-Longju	14,500	147	300 b/	500
			1,300	2,300
Li-ma	3,500	37	530 c/	200
Sub-total	28,000	282		4,800
<u>Garrisons</u>				
Lhasa	25,000	65	1,300 d/	1,000
Ch'ang-tu	30,000	78	540 e/	500
Sub-total	55,000	143		1,500
Total	83,000	425		6,300

a. Road from Tashigong to the railhead at Urunchi.

b. Road from Towang-Longju area to Lhasa and from Lhasa to the railhead at Hsia-tung.

c. Road from Li-ma to the railhead at Ch'eng-tu.

d. Road from Lhasa to the railhead at Hsia-tung.

e. Road from Ch'ang-tu to the railhead at Ch'eng-tu.

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For purposes of this report it has been assumed that the troops actually fighting are supplied each day with the tonnage of supplies which would be required under full combat conditions. The tonnages estimated, therefore, represent the maximum tonnages which would be required, because it is obvious from available reports that full-scale combat is not taking place daily. Furthermore, it is probable that the Chinese Communists have been stockpiling supplies in the Tibet area in anticipation of the action against India. The actual amounts shipped, therefore, could be considerably less than the maximum requirements, depending on the size and location of the stockpiles.

The Chinese Communist troops in the Ladakh area are estimated to be about 10,000 in number and would require a maximum of about 98 tons of supplies daily when actually engaged in combat. It is believed that these supplies would come from the railhead at Urunchi in the north by way of Korla, Kashgar, Karghalik, and Haji Lager. The Ladakh forces are approximately 1,500 road miles from Urunchi, so about 1,800 trucks would be needed to supply them with 98 tons daily on a sustained basis.

The combat forces in the Towang-Longju area probably number about 14,500 men. Their maximum daily requirement under combat conditions is estimated to be 147 tons. Supplies probably move from Lhasa, about 300 miles to the rear, by way of Chhusku, and Tsethang to Tsoma Dzong, Chayul, and the Subensiri area. Approximately 500 trucks would be needed to move 147 tons of supplies over this distance on a sustained basis.

About 3,500 troops are believed to be engaged in fighting at Li-ma. They would need at most only about 37 tons of supplies a day, which would probably be transported from the railhead at Ch'eng-tu. It is estimated that it would take about 200 trucks to move this tonnage the approximately 530 miles from Ch'eng-tu to Li-ma by way of Ya-an and Batang.

The garrison troops are located in the Lhasa and Ch'eng-tu areas, and are estimated to total about 55,000 men with the majority probably based in the Ch'eng-tu area. It has been assumed that approximately 30,000 men are at Ch'eng-tu, and that they would require a maximum of 78 tons of supplies a day. These supplies probably would come also from Ch'eng-tu, and would require about 500 trucks to transport them over the approximately 540 mile distance.

Garrison troops in the Lhasa area are estimated at 25,000 men. These troops supposedly are supplied over the Tsinghai-Tibet highway from Hsintung on the railroad in the north, a distance of about 1,300 miles. The maximum daily requirement for these forces probably would be about 65 tons. However, the forces in Towang-Longju area also are believed to be supplied from Lhasa, and they require an estimated maximum of 147 tons a day, which

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means that a total of 212 tons daily must be shipped to Lhasa. It would probably take about 3,300 trucks to transport 212 tons daily to Lhasa from Hsin-tung on a sustained basis. In addition to the trucks required to move supplies from Lhasa to the fighting front in the Northeast Frontier area, some additional trucks would be needed to move supplies to garrison units located to the southwest of Lhasa.

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